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Helping the CCP to Find its Own Way Toward 
Modernity: The Case of NGOs Providing Support 
to Migrant Workers in China.  
Chloé Froissart 
Université de Rennes 2 
 
Resumen 
Este artículo aborda la sociedad civil china a través del estudio 
de las organizaciones de apoyo a los trabajadores migrantes. En 
primer lugar, se analiza cómo las ONG tratan de superar un 
marco legal muy restrictivo y reconfigurar así la relación con el 
Estado. En segundo lugar, se analiza la socialización de los 
migrantes a través de las ONG y, finalmente, se discute cómo 
estas asociaciones representan los intereses de los migrantes e 
influyen en las políticas públicas.  
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Abstract 
This article aims to analyze the civil society in China 
throughout the study of the organizations supporting migrant 
workers. Considering first how NGOs try to overcome a highly 
restrictive legal framework and reconfigure the relationship 
with the state in more beneficial terms; second, how they 
socialize migrants; and finally, how they represent migrants’ 
interests and influence public policies. This paper highlights 
how NGOs contribute to redefine state-society relations and to 
change the system from inside, while also help the CCP to 
adapt and to maintain itself in power, hence to find its own way 
toward modernity. 
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HELPING THE CCP TO FIND ITS OWN 
WAY TOWARD MODERNITY: THE CASE 
OF NGOs PROVIDING SUPPORT TO 
MIGRANT WORKERS IN CHINA1   
Chloé Froissart 
 Université de Rennes 2 
Market reforms in China have created a space for the rise of a 
third sector; they also triggered the largest rural-urban 
migration-flow in the world history. Rural-urban migration is 
one of the major challenge that the Chinese Communist Party 
has to face: today, between 140 and 160 million peasants have 
left their villages to seek employment and a better life in urban 
areas, but appear as second-class citizens in the cities of their 
own country. This situation is mainly due to the resilience of 
the household registration system –also called residency 
system– (huji zhidu or hukou), on which the state always relied 
to control migration and the urbanization process, especially 
during the Maoist period when it prevented any social and 
spatial mobility. This system denies the right to anyone away 
from his/her place of registration to belong to the place where 
he/she immigrates, and strictly divides the population into rural 
and urban categories, the latter being granted privileges denied 
to the former. It gave birth to a hereditary status system in 
contravention of the Chinese Constitution that states every 
citizen’s equality before law. Since the reintroduction of 
markets at the beginning of the 1980’s, freedom of mobility has 
greatly increased thanks to the changes in the mode of resource 
allocation and employment, as well as the relative and de facto 
easing of control over migration, but migrant workers are still 
                                                 
1 Publication of this paper has been authorised by CIDOB-Barcelona Centre 
for International Affairs.  
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mainly treated as strangers in urban settings. While driving the 
Party –which now claims its will to promote a “rule by law”– 
into a legalization project, market reforms hence gave birth to a 
new social category denied full citizenship rights, but that is 
also more immune to social control despite all the Party’s 
efforts to regain control over this part of the population.  
Unlike peasants and state workers, migrants’ claims for rights 
protection are supported by Chinese so-called NGOs that first 
appeared toward the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 
2000s. Migrant workers indeed represent a particularly 
desirable target for these organizations. They face numerous 
hardships, including unequal and inadequate access to justice, 
housing, social welfare, medical care and education for their 
children. Because of their lack of professional qualifications 
and the segmentation of labor market due to discriminative 
policies against them, they do the dirtiest, most dangerous and 
badly paid jobs. They work in the industrial sector, but also in 
the construction and service sectors, where they usually face 
severe exploitation and abuse at the hand of managers who take 
advantage of their semi legal status and their dependence of the 
workplace for basic need such as food and housing. 
Organizations supporting migrant workers function as 
substitute for official trade unions from which these workers 
were long excluded and that are now increasingly deemed 
inefficient and sometimes illegitimate means of representation. 
NGOs also lobby authorities to improve migrant workers’ 
condition and thus appear as social structures capable of 
organizing migrants’ resistance and interacting with the state on 
a sustained basis. The development of these organizations 
indeed coincided with migrant workers stepping into the 
political arena:  
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First, the years 2002-2003 symbolize a turning point in the 
attitude of the Chinese government towards migrant workers. 
Until then, the central government had mainly turned a blind 
eye on the way urban authorities had taken advantage of the 
residency system not to grant any rights to migrant workers, 
and had increased the economic and administrative hurdles to 
prevent a “blind flood of migrants” into urban areas. In January 
2003 however, the State Council issued a Document no.1 on 
Successfully Managing the Employment of Rural Workers in 
the Cities and their Access to Public Services (Guowuyuan 
bangonting, 2003) that calls for the eradication of any kind of 
discriminative regulations or practices against migrant workers. 
This decree was followed by a number of important policies for 
the protection of migrant workers’ “legal rights”. 
Second, although migrants are known as a new working class 
whose rights are commonly violated, they long kept themselves 
out of popular contention: they were rather inclined to identify 
themselves to the status of second-class citizens and saw the 
state as unfavorable or even predatory to them (Solinger, 1999; 
Li, 2003). They therefore generally avoided contacts with 
authorities and, aware of being unwanted guests in the cities, 
were rather wary about voicing out claims. However, since the 
government acknowledged their right to have rights, migrant 
workers have been increasingly resorting to conciliatory bodies 
and tribunals along with strikes and demonstrations to settle 
labor conflicts (CLB, 2005; Froissart, 2006). 
Examining the role played by NGOs in this turning point, this 
paper argues that Chinese organizations contribute to create a 
civil society “à la chinoise” both combining top-down and 
down-top dynamics and based on a pragmatic cooperation 
between state and society. Considering first how NGOs try to 
evade a highly restrictive legal framework and reconfigure the 
relationship with the state in more beneficial terms, second how 
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they socialize migrants and finally how they represent 
migrants’ interests and influence public policies, this paper 
highlights how NGOs contribute to redefining state-society 
relations and to changing the system from inside while also 
helping the CCP to adapt and maintain itself in power, hence to 
find its own way toward modernity.   
Albeit the concept of “civil society” is derived from Western 
history, it has been increasingly used in China since its 
reintroduction at the beginning of the 1980s and went through 
different attempts by Chinese scholars to adapt it to Chinese 
reality (Ma, 1994; Deng, 1997, 1999; Cui, 2004). NGOs we 
surveyed often claim to be part of an emerging civil society: 
this paper thus aims to characterize Chinese civil society –or at 
least one if its multiple aspects– by analyzing the discourse and 
practices developed by these organizations supporting migrant 
workers. In order to understand what civil society means for 
NGOs, we need first to clarify what we ourselves understand by 
this term. To put it simply and overcome the historical and 
theoretical vagaries this concept went through, we can broadly 
distinguish two conceptions of civil society, one political and 
another one sociological. 2 The political conception of civil 
society refers to its liberal definition as developed by classical 
theorists in the 17th and 18th century. Locke for example 
understands civil society as a sphere in which people achieve 
political equality, moral integrity and autonomy regardless of 
the social differences in terms of status and property. Civil 
society is thus a political community that exists through the 
legal and institutional guaranty of individual rights understood 
                                                 
2 We follow here the distinction proposed by Gordon White, Jude Howell 
and Shang Xiaoshuang in their book In Search of Civil Society. Market 
Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996, pp. 3-4. 
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as being natural, inherent and inalienable. The sociological 
conception of civil society is referred as to “an intermediate 
associational realm that is situated between the state and [the 
private sphere], populated by social organizations which are 
separated (…) from the state and are formed voluntarily by 
members of society to protect or extend their interests and 
values”.3 This definition enables civil society to exist outside 
the realm of a democratic polity provided that these 
associations enjoy some degree of autonomy from the state and 
that their main function is to protect theirs members’ values and 
interests. Number of East-European scholars and activists 
linked these two conceptions together by assigning civil society 
the goal of promoting liberal democratization. Civil society was 
thus mainly defined by its functions: controlling the state by 
assigning limits to its power and possibly opposing it in order 
to promote alternative norms and values that directly contribute 
to define group identities and interests (Michnick, 1985; Havel, 
1985; Seligman, 1992: 15-36). We can hence first hold the 
capacity to produce new, alternative norms and values, as well 
as to assign certain limits to state power as the main criteria 
defining civil society. A set of questions can be derived from 
this definition: 
-To which extend do NGOs supporting migrant workers tend to 
gain more autonomy from the state and manage to limit state 
control and penetration? 
-Do NGOs foster migrants’ emergence as an autonomous self-
conscious group, both protecting their negative freedom vis-à-
vis the state and contributing to redefine their identity in order 
to promote their interests?  
                                                 
3 Ibid., p.3. 
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-To which extend do NGOs appear as capable to negotiating a 
new social contact in China by both promoting alternative 
values and contributing to shift the power balance in favor of 
the society? 
Growing Out of the State? 
Imposing a Leninist control over social organizations  
Contrary to Eastern Europe, the impetus for creating social 
organizations in China first came from the state. Following the 
deepening of market reforms and the dismantlement of the 
social and administrative units –such as the work units and the 
rural cooperatives–, that were previously dispending social 
welfare as long as playing a key role in controlling the 
population, the state encouraged the rise of a “third sector” to 
assist it in those tasks. Laws were published in 1989 and 1998 
that enabled the creation, on the one hand, of associations based 
on membership (shetuan), mainly professional, business, 
cultural or sport associations that are meant to represent the 
interests of their members while also being an indirect means of 
social administration and control; and on the other hand social 
non-profit organizations (minban feiqiye danwei), without 
membership, that are supposed to relieve the state of part of is 
social burden by developing social service activities (Wang and 
Liu, 2004; CDB, 2006). In law, organizations supporting 
migrant workers come under the second category. The rise of a 
“third sector” hence originated in the Party-state’s 
acknowledgement of its own limitation and in its call for social 
forces to help it perform its traditional functions. 
The principles of cooperation, control and cooptation are 
indeed at the core of the legislation regulating these 
organizations. They are submitted to a dual track registration 
system according to which they first have to find a 
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“professional leading unit”, that is a governmental or Party 
agency, before registering with the Ministry of Civil Affairs or 
its local bureaus. The sponsor –that has no statutory obligation 
to accept applicant– is responsible for providing “direction and 
supervision” –including of its financial sources and spending– 
and for conducting an annual review of the organization’s 
activities. The sponsor must be of a “relevant” sector, which 
prevents the organization from diversifying its activities. 
Finally, these organizations should not oppose the basic 
principles set out in the Constitution –that is, basically, 
Communist Party’s rule and official ideology–, endanger 
national security and unity, harm national interest nor go 
against social morality. The legislation thus provides that these 
organizations should be an extension of the state or at least 
serve as its auxiliaries (Guowuyuan, 1998a, 1998b). 
Negotiating a more beneficial relationship to the state and a 
broader scope of activities 
 
Whereas the law provides that “civil society” should not be 
separated from the state, many organizations enjoy, in practice, 
much more autonomy. Out of the five organizations I surveyed, 
only one truly complies with the law. These organizations 
actually have very different sociological profiles and can be 
ranged into four categories according to their degree of legality/ 
autonomy and the profile of their founders.  
There is first the West China Sichuan Relief Centre for Migrant 
Workers (Sichuan Huaxi nongmingong qiuzhu zhongxin) that 
truly falls into the category of “Government Operated Non-
Governmental Organization” (GONGO). These organizations 
are initiated by government staff, are supervised by their 
relevant state agencies and generally receive public funds. This 
centre was founded in 2003 in Chengdu (capital of Sichuan 
province) by one of the leaders of the provincial government 
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agency for the development of the work force linked to the 
Sichuan Province Bureau of Agriculture, and is supervised by 
this Bureau. This organization, which receives public funds, 
can thus be considered as an extension of the state. 
Second, there is Migrant Women’s Club (Dagongmei zhi jia) 
that was founded in 1996 in Beijing by the chief editor of the 
National Federation of Women publishing house and is 
supported by a famous representative of the Beijing 
Municipality People’s Congress who is a member of its 
management committee. Despite its closed connections with 
high-ranking officials, this organization is not a GONGO: it is 
registered as an enterprise with the Bureau of Industry and 
Commerce and is financially independent.  
Third can be distinguished NGOs set up by urban residents and 
not directly related to a state organization, although they often 
have many governmental connections. Beijing Cultural 
Communication Center for Facilitator (Beijing shi xiezuozhe 
wenhua chuanbo zhongxin) is one of those. It is registered as an 
enterprise and receives its funds from foreign foundations. It 
was set up in 2003 by two defectors from Migrant Women’s 
Club who also were previously working for the National 
Federation of Women publishing house and thus are well 
connected to officials and the media. The founders said they 
wanted to promote a more democratic organization relying to a 
greater extend on migrants’ active and direct participation. 
They also claim to be closer to the people and more legitimate 
as representative of migrant workers since part of their family 
members are peasants and themselves lived in the countryside 
during their childhood that coincided with the Rusticated Youth 
Movement (xiaxiang yundong). Practically however, these two 
organizations do not differ much in the way they function. 
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Fourth, there are NGOs run by migrant workers who think that 
migrants should only rely on themselves to defend their rights. 
They are registered as enterprises and are financed by foreign 
organizations. Home of Fellow Peasants (Nongyou zhi jia) was 
founded in 2002 in Beijing by a music teacher coming from the 
countryside and who became somehow famous chanting 
migrants’ condition. Shenzhen service centre for industrial 
security and health (Shenzhen dagongzhe zhiye anquan 
jiankang fuwu zhongxin) was set up in 2003 in Shenzhen by an 
injured migrant worker with the support of a Hong Kong right 
defense group that still supervises it. 
All these organizations but the first one –which case will be 
discussed thereafter– managed to circumvent the law in many 
ways. First, they are registered as businesses and are financially 
completely autonomous, regarding both their sources of 
funding and the way they spend their money. The dual track 
registration system constrain is indeed very often evaded in the 
reality: as state agencies are held responsible for the activities 
of the organizations they sponsor, they usually refuse to serve 
as their guarantor, and the organizations themselves are 
reluctant to seek such support to preserve some freedom of 
activity. Out of the three million NGOs counted by the Ministry 
of Civil Affairs in 2005, only 280.000 were registered as social 
organizations, others were known as enterprises.4 Registration 
as a business operation requires a minimal management 
structure with a high degree of autonomy. In return, 
organizations are supposed to pay taxes but most of them 
actually do not or run a subsidiary business activity –this is the 
case of the Shenzhen organization that sells industrial security 
devices–. Their half-legal status is tolerated as long as they 
prove their loyalty to the Party and their contribution to public 
                                                 
4 Kaifang (Open Magazine), June 12th, 2005. 
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good. NGOs hence manage to circumvent the principle of 
direct control that is at the core of the legislation and cannot be 
considered as an extension of the state despite the CCP efforts 
to ensure a Leninist kind of control over them. 
NGOs also managed to broaden the scope and aim of their 
activities beyond what is provided by the law. As mentioned 
above, popular non-profit organizations are expected to develop 
social activities to relieve the state social burden and most of 
them are indeed philanthropic or charity organizations. NGOs 
supporting migrant workers however appear as rights defense 
groups.  
As the authorities are very hostile to organizations that might 
represent the interests of disgruntled workers and compete with 
the All China Federation of Trade Union, NGOs often present 
themselves as organizations that promote recreational or 
educative programs, as stated by their names –Cultural 
Communication Center for Facilitator, Migrant Women’s Club 
etc.– They indeed offer a space of sociability to workers away 
from their home, professional training, general and health 
education, advice on urban life and organize artistic and 
cultural activities. These programs are meant to help migrants 
better integrate both culturally and professionally into the cities, 
and to prevent them to feel excluded by lack of social ties. But 
NGOs gradually put an emphasis on providing legal training 
and defending migrants’ “legal rights”. They offer free 
conciliation with employers or facilitate migrants’ access to 
administrative arbitration and tribunals by giving procedural 
advice, helping build up a judicial record, providing free or low 
rate legal services. NGOs filled up a vacuum: as a temporary 
workforce that was not considered as full-fledge workers, 
migrants were in practice long excluded from trade unions. 
Local officials also did not feel responsible for protecting the 
rights of non-residents and were rather inclined to collude with 
Helping the CCP to Find its Own Way Toward Modernity 11 
Inter Asia Papers ISSN 2013-1747 nº36/2013 
employers who need cheap labor force, deprived of any social 
or labor rights. As a result, a growing number of migrants 
started to claim back their wages, organizing demonstrations or 
publicly threatening to commit suicide. Faced with growing 
discontent, the government launched in 2003 a campaign to 
urge migrant workers to join trade unions (Quan zonggonghui, 
2003). However, as many migrants work in the informal sector, 
they remain out of the reach of the trade unions and those who 
are newly enrolled tend to see them as beholden to the 
management and useless (Froissart, 2005; CDB, 2005). 
Meanwhile, assuming that migrants’ going onto the streets was 
a sign of their “backwardness” and lack of legal culture, the 
Centre also fostered migrant workers’ legal training and called 
local governments to facilitate their access to state institutions 
and tribunals. All these new policies were launched in an 
attempt to channel grievances into legal redress and preserve 
social order, but were not really effective in improving 
migrants’ rights (Guowuyuan, 2006). NGOs hence anticipated 
the Center’s changing policy toward migrant workers and later 
claimed to strictly enforce it, while also operating as a 
substitute of distrusted official trade unions. Migrants are more 
confident that NGOs can better defend their rights, not only 
since they perceive them as independent from the capital and 
different from Party and state agencies, but also because these 
organizations try to mobilize the media and their personal 
connections within the elite to make injustice and unfair trials 
public as long as to put pressure on state institutions so that 
they take workers’ grievances into account. NGOs also publish 
journals in which they document and analyze difficulties 
commonly faced by migrants.5 These journals seek not only to 
                                                 
5  Journals published by Migrant Women’s Club include Dagongmei 
(Migrant Women), Dagongmei zhi jia tongxun (Migrant Women’s Club 
Journal) and Nongjianü Baishitong  (Rural Women Knowing All); Beijing 
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reach a public of migrants but also the whole society in order to 
raise “public awareness”. NGOs hence organize migrants’ 
“rightful resistance”, which is defined by Kevin O’Brien and 
Lianjiang Li as a popular resistance that refers to official 
policies and the Center’s discourse to curb political and 
economic power. This kind of resistance operates partly within 
–yet in tension with– official norms and near the boundary of 
authorized channel, combining legal action with some kind of 
political pressure by locating influential allies and mobilizing 
support from the wider public (O’Brien and Li, 2006). More 
and more migrants are seeking NGO’s help or are working for 
them as volunteers during their free time. Many workers 
interviewed admitted that they would never have obtained or 
even sought legal redress without the help of these 
organizations. NGOs also developed advocacy activities that 
are not stated by the law and managed to assert themselves as 
new forms of representation and mediation between migrants 
and the state, as it will be discussed in the last part. 
The West China Sichuan Relief Centre for Migrant Workers 
differs from these organizations not only regarding its 
institutional status but also its activities. It acts as an itinerant 
trade union and directly intervenes in different localities with 
employers and local authorities to settle disputes involving 
Sichuanese migrants. It also compensates for migrant workers’ 
lack of social security by granting them a lump sum in case of 
emergency or in compensation to disability related to an 
industrial accident. This organization’s professed aim is to 
                                                                                                        
Facilitator issue Dagongshidai (Dagong times), and Home of Fellow 
Migrants Nongyou zhijia xinnian tongxun (Home of Fellow Migrants’ New 
Year Journal). NGOs also regularly send information letters and e-report 
like Women zai yiqi (We are together) written by Beijing Facilitator 
volunteers. 
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compensate government program to enroll migrant workers in 
trade union by working with hard-to-rich transients and by 
sharing a social burden that is too large for government to 
assume alone. It does not offer legal training, does not organize 
migrant workers on a sustained basis nor has it developed any 
advocacy activities; as such we will not include it in our study. 
NGOs thus evolve in a non-institutionalized grey zone in which 
they manage to evade the Leninist kind of control the state 
wants to impose them; they develop activities in the interest of 
migrant workers, put some pressure on the state and operate on 
the boundary of what is permitted. However, as their status is 
very unsecured, they need to provide token of obedience to the 
Party, seek support among influential officials and try to 
develop programs in collaboration with public institutions        
–universities, street committees, neighborhood communities– 
in the hope to be acknowledged as official partners of the state. 
On the other hand, the state remains obsessed with the idea that 
these organizations -that are financed by foreign foundations- 
could serve a foreign political agenda and stir up a color 
revolution as in the ex-Soviet Republics (Lawrence, 2003; Ma 
2005). 6 It thus try to prevent NGOs from growing more 
autonomous and developing political activities by combining 
repression with cooptation: in 2004 Beijing Facilitator won the 
title of “Outstanding organization for education and social 
service to young migrants” awarded by the Communist Youth 
League Beijing Committee, the Training Center for Rural 
Women that is affiliated to Migrant Women’s Club won the 
award of the “Best school founded by social forces”, the leader 
of Home of Fellow Peasants was elected “Nationally 
outstanding young migrant worker” in 2005 because he had 
given information to state organs about migrant workers.  
                                                 
6 Kaifang, no.10, July 2005 
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NGOs hence manage to negotiate a more beneficial relationship 
to the state than the one provided by the law. However, the 
close intertwined relationship some of them have with the state, 
the threat of being banned at any time and the strategy of 
cooptation developed by the government lead them to a close 
embedded relationship with the state thanks to which they 
acquire viability and legitimacy. This does not mean that they 
have no role to play in changing the system. NGO’s are one of 
the main channels through which global norms are introduced 
into Chinese society. Being also accountable to their founders 
and provided that some of them have developed cooperation 
programs with their foreign counterparts, they have come to use 
a vocabulary and to refer to methods of action that match 
foreign organizations’ expectations. They thus emphasize “self-
governance” –NGOs’ staff are mainly migrant workers–, 
“democratic participation” within the organization, workers’ 
“empowerment” and “capacity building”, as many expressions 
meaning that they aim to endorse migrants with the capacity to 
defend their rights autonomously.7 They also foster analytical 
and critical capacity as well as freedom of expression among 
migrant workers, encouraging them to contribute to the journals 
and information letters they publish. NGOs hence try to build 
up an image of themselves opposite to the one of mass 
organizations that are Party transmission belts permanently 
exercising a top-down control over the people.  
How do NGOs enforce these values in the way they socialize 
migrants, defend their rights and represent their interests? 
                                                 
7 Migrant Women’s Club brochure states “The most prominent mission of 
the Club is to empower migrant women for self-protection and 
management”, and “If you are given a fruit, you can enjoy it only once; but 
if you are given a seed, you can benefit from it your whole life”. Beijing 
Facilitator’ motto is “Helping people help themselves”. 
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NGOs’ Ambiguous Role: New Right Defense 
Groups or Old Mass Organizations? 
 
NGOs widely propagate legal knowledge and promote rights 
awareness among migrant workers. As a young migrant 
volunteer in the Shenzhen NGO, put it: “Only after attending 
the classes did I know that overtime should be paid, that when 
you get hired by a company you are not supposed to pay a 
deposit to your employer but you are supposed to sign a work 
contract with him”.8 Legal training workshops held by NGOs 
radically change the way migrants perceive the law, while also 
emphasizing more equality among citizens. Traditionally in 
China, the law was associated with punishment and perceived 
as a tool used by rulers to control the population (Chu, 2006: 
72; O’Brien and Li, 2004: 94). This view was particularly 
persistent among migrant workers as, until recently, laws and 
regulations indeed primary aimed at controlling this population 
and emphasized their duties rather than their rights. For the 
same reasons, migrant workers were and still remain rather 
reluctant to sign a work contract with their employers, and see 
any legal bound as a way to relinquish their freedom to leave 
their employer if things go awry with him. However, without 
contract, migrants can hardly legally claim back their wages 
and compensation in case of industrial accident. Training also 
helps migrants to broaden their claims and to seek equal 
treatment with urban workers. In the past, complaints mainly 
regarded the payment of salaries, but now claims also concern 
social security enrolment, holiday or professional training. 9 
                                                 
8 Interview, December 2004. 
9 The Ministry of Labor and Social Security reported in its press organ on 
NGOs’ key role in improving migrant workers’ rights consciousness, and 
cited the case of a female migrant worker who sued her employer for not 
giving her paid leave. See “Daixin xiujia guansi tuxian falü kongbai” 
16 Chloé Froissart 
Inter Asia Papers ISSN 2013-1747 nº36/2013 
During the classes, migrants hence learn that the law applies to 
them as to urban people and that it is not only an instrument to 
protect employers or rulers’ interests but also exist to protect 
their rights.  
NGOs also hold workshops aimed at building-up group identity 
and self-confidence. Migrants share their experience and draw 
lessons from it, analyze the role played by social and 
administrative structures –like the hukou system– in the 
difficulties they encounter, as well as the widening discrepancy 
between their place in the society and their growing 
contribution to China economic development. Migrants thus 
acquire a new positive identity: whereas they used to perceive 
themselves as unwanted guests in the cities, they now tend to 
identify with a new working class that boost the country 
economic growth and therefore expect a new contract with the 
state. As migrants often outline: “We are making a great 
contribution to national development, our rights should be 
protected”, or “I respect the society where I live and work, I 
expect it to respect me in return”. Participants of the workshops 
also analyze legal cases, assess the legality of verdicts brought 
by conciliatory bodies and tribunals, and become aware of the 
gap between law stipulations and real situations. Workshops 
thus play a crucial role in changing the “frame alignment” 
(Snow and Rochford, 1986), that is in shifting the 
responsibilities attributions: migrants gradually come to explain 
their condition not so much referring to their personal qualities 
–being from the countryside, less educated and qualified than 
urban people, what the dominant discourse states as “being of 
law quality” (suzhi tai di)– but by the contradiction between the 
                                                                                                        
(Litigation over paid leave exposes blank in law), Zhongguo laodong 
baozhang baogao (China Labour and Social Security News), August 26, 
2004. 
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resilience of the hukou system and China’s economic and social 
changes, as well as the failures of the system as a whole. As 
migrant workers now commonly say: “What matters now, is 
not that there is no law to rely on, but that the law is not 
reliable, its implementation is not strict and infringements have 
no limits”.10  
NGOs nurture expectations for a more reciprocal relationship 
with the state and propagate awareness of legal citizenship as 
well as of the gap between the rights promised and the rights 
enforced. However, NGOs’ aim remains first and foremost to 
educate good citizens and to strengthen the Party’s legitimacy 
while maintaining rights defense in the framework of what is 
deemed politically correct. Underlining the system’s failure is 
all but directed at undermining the Party’s legitimacy. First, the 
central government is not held responsible for migrants’ rights 
being violated: it is rather credited with publishing new laws 
and policies in favor of migrant workers that disloyal officials 
are not enforcing at the local level. As stated by an aggrieved 
worker: “The Center can not control what ever local officials 
do”. Second, NGOs try to persuade migrant workers of the 
Party’s capacity to reform the system, namely thanks to the 
advocacy activities they have developed: rights’ protection 
have already made a lot of progress and more improvement is 
to come. Finally, telling migrants about the costs (both in time 
and money) that any legal procedures implies and about the gap 
between law stipulations and verdicts brought is often aimed at 
deterring them from seeking an official statement (tao ge 
shuofa, tao ge gongdao), that is to put the state to the test by 
appealing against judgments that are deemed unjust: migrants 
better resign themselves to conciliation with their employers 
and lesser compensation than they could legally claim than 
                                                 
10 See for example Zhang (2004), p.6 
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completely loosing faith in the system. While building up a 
hope in a better future, NGOs also help migrant workers defend 
their rights more effectively within the present system, acting 
as intermediary between migrants and uncaring or inefficient 
institutions, broadening their social network and support, 
providing psychological and technical aid, as well as fostering 
mutual help: social solidarity hence should compensate for the 
failure of the system. NGOs thus do little more than sticking to 
the governmental project to increase the recourses to legal 
procedure, and compensate for the lack of juridical guarantee of 
rights by being an alternative to the failings of the institutions.11 
One of their aims is indeed to prevent workers from resorting to 
any action that the state could condemn as disruptive: taking to 
the streets, petitioning the Central government or threatening to 
commit suicide. NGOs thus contribute to maintain social 
stability by exerting a kind of social control over migrant 
workers. 
NGOs also foster a top-down form of citizenship education, 
while giving to this concept a moral rather than political 
content. Migrants are supposed helpless and ignorant, and 
managers of these organizations appear as benevolent parents 
or teachers who exercise a moral authority upon their children/ 
students. Speaking of the founder of Beijing Facilitator, who 
they call “Professor Li”, workers say: “She shows us unstinting 
love”. NGOs work style thus recalls mass organizations 
paternalism and autocratic tradition, which is also underlined 
by the resilient use of a communist vocabulary. The workshops 
are called “xiaozu” (little groups), a term that applied during the 
                                                 
11 It would be interesting to draw a parallel between the way NGOs serving 
migrant workers substitute for the lack of rule of law and the way poverty 
alleviation NGOs and charity funds substitute for the construction of a 
welfare state. 
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Cultural Revolution to a committee in charge of a highly 
important political work (like Wenhua da gemin xiaoxu). These 
workshops are conducted by “cadres” (gugan), a word that 
refers to people who distinguished themselves within a group 
by their revolutionary enthusiasm and were thus charged to 
convey the leaders’ orders to the masses. Finally, these 
organizations sometimes also call themselves “tuandui” (team), 
which refers to the groups of rusticated youths that were send to 
the countryside after the Cultural Revolution, and namely to 
those who were working in military farms. This term denotes 
an iron discipline and is used today to refer to a team whose 
members share the same commitment and unite their strength, 
bolster their spirits to achieve a common goal.  
“Socialist morality” –understood as a blend of traditional 
Confucian morality and an ethos of comradeship– plays a 
fundamental role in the way migrants are socialized. NGOs 
endeavor to build up solidarity among migrants upon apolitical 
symbols, like the one of “family/home” (jia), a word that 
appears in most of these organizations’ names (Nongyou zhi jia, 
Dagongmei zhi jia) and evokes communitarian rather than 
political bounds. NGOs indeed want to appear as a family for 
isolated workers away from their home and emphasize self-
development and mutual aid among migrant workers as the one 
that would be expected among members of the same family. 
More broadly, NGOs try to convey an ethos of comradeship or 
“civic virtue”, centering on the notion of “volunteerism”, which 
emphasizes commitment to the collective and the possibility to 
realize oneself by doing something good to others and society, 
as shown by Beijing Facilitator’s motto: “helping people help 
themselves”. But the “family” (jia) idiom also refers to the 
traditional conception of power as a benevolent authority 
exercised on subjects: it thus appears in official trade unions’ 
new motto to attract migrant workers: “gonghui shi wo de jia” 
(the trade union is my home), as well as in the term used in 
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Chinese to design the nation-state: “guojia” (country, 
kingdom/family). The nation-state is indeed traditionally seen 
as an extended family where citizens perform their duties and 
show loyalty to the government that, in return, gives them 
certain restricted rights (Li and Wu, 1999; Chu, 2006). NGOs 
thus convey the official conception of citizenship as being both 
passive and moral, and they remind migrant workers of their 
duties toward the Party and the society as much as they help 
them to seize on law to defend their rights. In this sense, they 
foster the “civic morality” (gongmin daode) promoted by the 
Party as a way to compensate the consequences of liberalization 
on individualization (Chu, 2006) and whose core principles are: 
“patriotism and compliance to the law, civility and honesty, 
unity and kindness, frugality and self-improvement, 
commitment to one’s work and contribution to society”.12 
NGOs thus play a somehow ambiguous role in the way they 
conduct social work: they foster rights awareness among 
migrant workers, are instrumental in building this group new 
social identity, nurture new expectations vis-à-vis the state and 
enhance and broaden migrants’ “rightful resistance”. However, 
because of both political constraints –especially the necessity to 
secure an uncertain status– and their cultural legacy, these 
organizations also appear to some extend as a transmission belt 
of the Party-state, fostering official ideology among migrant 
workers and exerting a kind of social control over them in order 
to maintain unity and social stability. How, in return, do they 
                                                 
12 “Gongmin daode jianshe shishi gangyao” (Guidelines for implementing 
civic morality), www.ydjps.sc.cn; “Jiaqiang gaijin gongmin daode jianshe 
goujian shehuizhuyi hexie shehui” (Enhance and promote the construction of 
a civic morality to build-up a socialist harmonious society), 
www.civilness.com  
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represent migrant workers’ interests and try to influence public 
policies? 
The Quest for New Forms of Representation: 
Toward a Corporatist Authoritarianism? 
 
Some of the NGOs, like Migrant Women’s Club and Beijing 
Facilitator, initiated advocacy meetings attended by academic 
specialists, social workers, high-ranking officials and cadres of 
mass organizations, but also migrant workers who are 
encouraged to speak for themselves and hence get a chance to 
directly convey their concerns and suggestions to the 
government. These meetings indeed aim to inform the power 
about the needs and difficulties of migrant workers, make high 
ranking officials aware of the pervasive violation of their rights, 
try to identify the reasons of rights infringements and suggest 
remedies.13 
These meetings are based on the principle of a pragmatic 
cooperation between state and society through cross-sectoral 
partnership in order to find solution in common. Whereas 
collaboration between the intellectuals and the power is a 
permanent feature of Chinese political culture (Cheek, 1994, 
Nathan, 1997: 66; Béja, 2004: 106-110, 195-200), those who 
were previously excluded from this collaboration pattern –the 
poor and uneducated people– are now part of it. Even Sun 
                                                 
13 For example, Migrant Women’s Club organized round tables on young 
migrant women’s rights protection (1999), on the hukou system and 
women’s migration (2001), and on improving rights’ protection for migrants 
working in the informal sector (2004). Beijing Facilitator organized two 
round tables in 2004, one dealing with health and security at work and the 
other dealing with systemic innovations to improve migrant workers’ access 
to public services.  
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Heng, the migrant workers who founded Home of Fellow 
Peasants because he thought that migrants “should not only be 
represented by urbanites and intellectuals [for whom] it is really 
hard to truly understand what the mass of people at lower level 
want”, attends these conferences since he is persuaded that 
“society can not be changed by a social class but by the 
cooperation between different social spheres”.14 
While there is a growing awareness among non-official 
participants –including migrants– that the main problem to be 
tackle is not the lack of legislation but the lack of 
implementation of existing laws, those meetings seldom give 
rise to claims for bold political reforms but rather for the design 
of new state policies in favor of migrant workers and 
substantive law improvement.15  Representatives ground their 
claim on the fact that migrants have already become a new 
working class that have superseded the old working class of 
urban state workers, and contribute the most to the nation well 
being. Migrants therefore should enjoy rights commensurate 
with their growing contribution to national development. While 
enhancing migrant’s public image, NGOs try to foster a 
morally based social contract between authorities and migrant 
workers recalling the moral commitment the state used to have 
toward state workers under socialism (Gallagher, 2005: 60-61). 
Migrants’ supporters also use utilitarian arguments to gain 
support among officials: rights should be granted to migrant 
workers in order to improve economic development and 
administration efficiency, as well as to maintain social stability. 
Participants hence do not challenge the state instrumental 
                                                 
14 Interview, June 2005. 
15 It is thus ironic that Migrant Women’s Club held in 2004 a conference 
devoted to the protection of migrants working in the informal sector months 
after a related legislation was passed. 
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conception of rights: they rather try to persuade the Party that 
its interests are identical to those of migrant workers and that 
improving their lot will benefit the entire nation. NGO’s thus 
sustain an antipolitic stance, treating political issues as if they 
were exclusively moral or administrative in nature, and 
proposing technical remedies to achieve a goal that is 
supposedly shared by the Party-state and the society alike 
(Moody, 2001; Béja, 2004). 
These conferences indeed serve the interests of the Party and 
migrant workers as well. They respond to the inclusive strategy 
of the state that tends to allow some kind of representation to 
each social group within the political system as a means to 
prevent claim radicalization and growing autonomy for the 
society. Such meetings are a way to rally elites, who are proud 
to serve as experts, and contribute to migrant workers’ 
emergence from their previous isolation. They also enable top 
officials to gather information they would not otherwise be able 
to get, and help them to design public policies that better meet 
people’s expectations. NGOs thus abide by the governmental 
project to enhance the overall administration of the society and 
to create more effective, responsive institutions without 
proceeding to core political reforms. Such conferences indeed 
appear as non-institutionalized consultative channels: they do 
not shift the power balance in favor of society –political 
decisions remain uncontested in leaders’ hands– and do not 
promote the Party accountability to the society. Moreover, by 
promoting group-specific interests without bargaining for 
negative freedoms vis-à-vis the state nor for true political 
participation, they somehow continue the status-based structure 
of Chinese society: migrant workers’ “rights” should be granted 
and protected by the state according to the new function 
performed by this group in the society while remaining 
subordinated to the Party’s interests. At the same time, NGOs 
also negotiate a new social contract for migrant workers within 
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the political system, playing a key role in the integration of a 
social group that was previously excluded. There is no doubt 
that such consultative conferences directly or indirectly 
contributed to the design of new public policies in favor of 
migrant workers, related to work security, social insurance, 
education and even reforms of the hukou system. 16  Those 
conferences hence illustrate the “Chinese” definition of civil 
society given by many local theorists, such as Deng Zhenglai, 
as a “constructive interaction” between state and society (Deng, 
1997, 1999). 
The fact that NGOs explicitly repudiate confrontational tactics 
and express their desire to work constructively with the state 
rather than opposing it, thwarts our conception of civil society, 
which we generally define in terms of clear separation and 
confrontation between state and society. Many Chinese NGOs 
are rather convinced that close relationships with government, 
nurtured by personal relations, and cooperation can better help 
to achieve their goals. As a volunteer in Beijing Facilitator very 
pragmatically outlines: “We promote civil society because 
social movements are not possible in China”.17  NGOs crave 
better relations with the state in order to get more legal space 
and be endorsed as natural partners of the government. It is thus 
as important for them to be acknowledged as legitimate by the 
state than by their own constituencies. However, while 
                                                 
16 For example, in December 2004, the Ministry of Public Health announced 
that migrant workers’ integration within local health insurance systems was 
part of municipal governments’ responsibilities and in May 2005, Beijing 
Municipality published new regulations stating employers’ duty to 
contribute for their migrant employers’ assurance in case of work injury and 
condemning the trespassers to a 10.000 Yuan fine. Beijing Facilitator sees 
these new regulations as a direct consequence of the round table on health 
and security at work it organized. 
17 Interview, May 2004. 
Helping the CCP to Find its Own Way Toward Modernity 25 
Inter Asia Papers ISSN 2013-1747 nº36/2013 
“promoting civil society” means emphasizing commonalities 
rather than differences, it should also be understood as a 
conscious strategy: the founder of Beijing Facilitator hence 
defines the conferences as a new platform where a plurality of 
points of view are expressed. 18 Provided that the Party 
leadership is not called into question, voices and perspectives 
are indeed not exactly the same. Whereas civil society in China 
is not politically oriented, it also infuses in a subtle manner a 
new narrative about how social progress should be conceived 
while also fostering systemic innovations. “Promoting civil 
society” also means linking the state and the society in a new 
way, as the regime evolves toward an authoritarian corporatist 
pattern based on a half-constrained, half-consensual 
collaboration rather than acknowledgement of conflicting 
interests. NGOs supporting migrant workers indeed share some 
characteristics with corporatist associations that the state has 
promoted these past few years among other social groups, like 
entrepreneurs and state workers (Unger and Chan, 1996; White, 
Howell and Shang, 1996). They are representative bodies –co-
opted by the Party– of group-specific interests that try to 
bargain with the state on a cooperative rather than contentious 
basis in order to contribute to a national mission: reducing 
social conflicts, building a “harmonious society” and turning 
China into a powerful and prosperous country. However, NGOs 
also differ from professional associations and official trade 
unions inasmuch as they are not membership-based 
organizations, while the conferences they organize, attended by 
a plurality of social actors, are not institutionalized. The 
corporatist evolution of the regime still lacks proper 
codification and is not entirely mastered by the state. This is the 
                                                 
18 Opening speech to the conference Nongmingong zhengce gaige yu fuwu 
chuangxin (Public Policy Reform and Service Innovation for Migrant 
Workers), Beijing, November 2004. 
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reason why it does not match some fundamental features –as 
the distinction between state and societal corporatism, the 
limitation of the number of associations that should be 
hierarchically ordered– defining corporatism according to 
Schmitter (1974). However, the Party showed its capacity to 
adapt and turn society’s initiative to its benefit when allowing 
for the first time three migrant workers representatives to sit in 
the National People’s Congress in March 2008, thus confirming 
the regime’s trend to move toward a corporatist 
authoritarianism. This symbolic acknowledgement of migrant 
workers as a new political group is a very clever attempt to 
prevent them from growing more autonomous and from 
developing more politicized claims. The institutionalization of 
migrants’ contention thus reflects society’s greater inclusion 
within the state. More over, this newly gained political 
representation does not mean –as it was widely claimed by the 
Chinese media– that migrant workers are now treated on equal 
footing with other citizens. Migrant workers account for over 
ten percent of China's population, but only one tenth of one 
percent of NPC deputies. There is thus little chance that their 
voice will have a significant impact on parliamentary 
proceedings. Finally, this new form of representation also tends 
to divide workers from rural and urban origins, notifying to the 
latter that the new working class already supplanted them both 
politically and in collective representations. 
However, such a move is not unanimously greeted by migrant 
workers and their organizations. The Shenzhen NGO questions 
this mode of representation within the political system fostered 
by Beijing NGOs. According to its leader, this political 
representation mediated by elites and based on collaboration 
with the state as well as the search for consensus “does not 
promote autonomous development of migrant workers as a 
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group”.19 He views Beijing organizations as “Counselors to the 
Prince” beholden to the State and as illegitimate representatives 
–being urban, non elected, close to power– of a population 
deprived of any direct means of political expression. According 
to his point of view, trying to orientate reforms by advising the 
State is tantamount to acknowledging its legitimacy and the 
legitimacy of the current system as a whole. This organization 
developed a somehow different strategy: it mainly spreads legal 
and job security information among workers, provides 
assistance to those who want to lodge complaints against or sue 
their employer but first and foremost encourages workers to 
help one another and to act as legal representative for each 
others. The ultimate aim of this association is to encouraging 
migrant workers to gradually unite and organize to eventually 
change the political system through collective actions. This 
kind of radicalism is closely linked to the characteristics of 
Shenzhen, which is far away from the Centre and where 
migrant workers are concentrated in industrial districts, thus 
having little connections with the local urban population. 
Workers in Shenzhen generally join labor organizations 
because they are aggrieved and eager to defend their rights, 
whereas many members of the Beijing organizations mentioned 
above are employed in the service sector and are also looking 
for a place of sociability and an opportunity to improve their 
general knowledge. More importantly, migrants’ NGOs in 
Shenzhen have close relations with foreign labor groups, 
especially the ones based in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong rights 
defense groups, which act as counselors and supervisors to 
                                                 
19 Interview with this NGO’s leader and other migrant volunteers, Shenzhen, 
December 2004. 
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these organizations, infuse other political references and 
connect them to international workers movements, such as the 
“people’s organizations” in Thailand, insisting that workers 
should speak for themselves and strive for autonomy. There 
now should be around fifteen organizations made up of migrant 
workers in the Pearl River Delta. However, as NGOs run by 
migrants, especially those who have such international 
exposure, are politically very sensitive and are even more likely 
than other organizations to be banned at any time, they are 
reluctant to unite and often have no choice but to agree to some 
kind of collaboration with the state. 
At the end of this study on NGOs supporting migrant workers, 
it appears that civil society in China is better apprehended 
through a combination of top-down and down-top dynamics 
that reveals a symbiotic –rather than a clear-cut and 
confrontational– relationship between state and society through 
which both are transformed. The state now depends on these 
organizations as much as they depend on the state to manage 
the society, and the way they interact provides not only for new 
public policies but also for some systemic innovations, thus 
contributing to changing the regime from inside. This also 
means that, as civil society plays a key role in the functioning 
and the adaptation of the regime, its development does not 
foster dramatic political changes. While the development of 
civil society in China is underpinned by a new discourse on 
citizenship, this concept still very much differs from the liberal 
paradigm. First, it is strictly restricted to a narrow legal 
definition. Negative rights toward the state are sacrificed to the 
advancement of interests through a negotiation that seek to 
reach a balance between those of individuals and those of the 
Party-state. Similarly, NGOs’ participative ideology is quite 
ambiguous: participation does not appear as an end in itself as it 
is very much directed in the governance of the organizations 
themselves, hence showing the difficulty to translate 
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participatory rhetoric into organizational practice, while it is not 
politically consequential during the consultative conferences. 
Second, “citizenship” also appears to be increasingly 
understood as a renewed civic –or moral– engagement that 
seeks to make a greater contribution to the construction of a 
“harmonious society” for the benefit of the Party and the whole 
society alike. 
NGOs supporting migrant workers in China play a somehow 
ambivalent role that lead us to reconsider the civil society 
paradigm as an analytical model of social change founded on 
the prediction that growth in autonomous social organizations 
leads to greater societal independence from the state and 
eventually to democratization. These organizations manage to 
open-up the social space and to negotiate a more beneficial 
relationship with the state in order to evade the Leninist kind of 
control it tries to impose on them. They nurture migrants’ rights 
awareness and contribute to build up their new social identity, 
while also enhancing their ability to defend their rights. 
However, they also compensate for institutional failings, filling 
the gap in the political system without opposing it, hence 
actually playing a key role in the state functioning. In the way 
they conduct social work, NGOs also appear to some extend as 
transmission belts, fostering official ideology among migrant 
workers and exerting a kind of social control over them in order 
to maintain stability and unity. As constituency advocacy 
groups, they foster a corporatist model of representation, which 
somehow continues the status-based structure of Chinese 
society, emphasize collaboration over the acknowledgement of 
conflicting interests and enable migrants’ deeper inclusion 
within the state. NGOs thus prevent the rise of a liberal 
conception of citizenship anchored in individual rights and 
preempt migrant workers’ emergence as an autonomous group, 
but they have been effective in negotiating with the state to 
influence policy-making process and to foster some limited 
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institutional changes, hence contributing to integrate a social 
group that was previously excluded. NGOs thus basically 
appear as patriotic organizations promoting a civil society “à la 
chinoise” based on a pragmatic cooperation between state and 
society, and involved in the construction of a powerful and 
prosperous China. Representing the interests of both the Party-
state and their constituency, they contribute to maintaining the 
status quo while also changing the system from inside. Helping 
the Party to adapt and find its own way toward modernity, they 
prevent a democratic transition in the short-term or even the 
medium-term, but playing a key role in changing mentalities 
and social identities, promoting right awareness anchored in a 
new legal citizenship and nurturing differentiation among the 
elites, they also sow the seeds of possible future changes. 
However, the different sociological profiles of the 
organizations I surveyed somehow affect their work and 
political orientation. As GONGOs appear as mere substitute for 
the government in the areas where it cannot make achievements 
and seem to be less concerned by representing their 
constituencies and influencing public policies, some NGOs run 
by migrant workers in the Pearl River Delta, as the one I 
surveyed in Shenzhen, appear to be more critical about the 
benefice of a partnership with the state and the elites. As more 
research is needed in order to highlight these regional and 
sociological variations, a new question arises: to which extend 
efforts made by NGOs run by migrant workers to spread 
heterodox patterns of social belief and behavior may affect 
state-society relations in the future?  
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